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Case No. 20050078 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
Petitioner Larry Davis, by and through his attorneys, hereby replies to the Brief of 
the Respondent. In doing so, Davis reasserts the arguments and authorities presented in 
the initial Brief of Petitioner and makes the following additional points and clarifications. 
Any argument not specifically addressed herein is not waived, but has been briefed in the 
initial Brief of Petitioner. 
INTRODUCTORY RESPONSE 
Throughout the Brief of the Respondent, Hatch extensively refers to the trial court 
proceedings in support of his position. See Brief of Respondent at 2-16. Unfortunately, 
this \ersion of what actually took place below is incomplete and very misleading. Davis is 
hamstrung in his ability to correct Hatch's misleading recitations, however, because the 
transcripts included in the appellate record were carefully selected by Hatch to only 
include those portions which create the appearance of support for his arguments. In 
violation of the clear requirements of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedurel 1(e)(3), and as 
noted by the Court of Appeals,1 Hatch submitted an incomplete record without advising 
either the court or Davis that he was doing so. Consequently, the testimony of 11 trial 
witnesses called by Davis as well as critical arguments and discussions with the trial court 
and counsel, which addressed the very issues of this appeal, are not a part of the record. 
Relative to every issue presented by this case, Hatch boldly invites this Court to rule 
based only upon those portions of the record he has chosen to present, without presuming 
that the trial court's findings, as well as a jury verdict, are supported by competent 
and sufficient evidence. Consistent with long established precedent, this Court must 
reject this tactic and find that "[njeither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct 
appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcripf'and that 
when a complete record is not provided, a reviewing court must not speculate as to 
what may have occurred, but instead presumes that the trial court's findings, as well 
as a jury verdict, are supported by competent and sufficient evidence. See e.g., Utah 
R. App. P. 11(e)(2); State v. Cramer, 44 P.3d 690, 697 (Utah 2002) (presuming trial court 
made correct legal determination where appellant failed to include all relevant evidence 
on appeal); State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985) ("We cannot speculate on the 
existence of facts that do not appear in the record. When crucial matters are not included 
in the record, the missing portions are presumed to support the action of the trial court"); 
State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998) (appellate court "simply cannot 
rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the 
'See Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App. 378,1f47. 
2 
record"); State v. Nine Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars, 791 P.2d 213, 217 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("Since counsel failed to provide this court with all relevant 
evidence bearing on the issues raised on appeal, as required by Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2), 
we can only presume that the judgment was supported by sufficient evidence" (internal 
citations omitted)); Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002-03 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("In 
essence, Rule 11 directs counsel to provide this court with all evidence relevant to the 
issues raised on appeal"). 
ARGUMENT 
I. HATCH WAIVED ENTITLEMENT TO A JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BY FAILING TO SUBMIT A CORRECT 
INSTRUCTION. 
A. The Court Of Appeals Reversed Based Upon An Issue That Was Both 
Unpreserved And Not Properly Supported By The Record. 
Of a threshold matter, Hatch did not properly preserve the jury instruction issue he 
ultimately asserted before the Court of Appeals-that a statute of limitations instruction 
in general should have been given. See Brief of Petitioner at 20-23. More specifically, 
Hatch only objected at trial to the trial court's refusal of Hatch's own proposed 
instruction.2 Hatch claims, however, that the "issue was properly preserved because the 
2If the concepts of "preservation" and "marshaling" mean anything, it must be 
applied here. Simply, there was no true dispute as to the statute of limitations at trial and 
Hatch at no time argued for an instruction which attempted to accurately convey the law 
as guided by this Court in Retherfordv. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 975 (Utah 
1992), as discussed herein. Rather, Hatch insisted on his own misleading instruction or 
none at all. To now allow him to argue that he preserved the matter in the absence of any 
record effectively grants him license to recreate history. 
3 
trial court ruled on the statute of limitations issue stating that it was not a legitimate issue 
for the jury to consider." Respondent's Brief at 23. Hatch misses the point. While 
showing how the trial court responded to his post-trial motions, it offers nothing relative 
to how Hatch acted, and more specifically, that Hatch posed any proper and specific 
objection at trial, explaining his grounds, with specificity, in challenging the trial court's 
decision. 
In R. T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, this Court conclusively stated, 
in order to appeal the giving of or the refusal of a jury instruction, a party 
must properly object to the instructions in the trial court and explain its 
grounds, with specificity, for challenging the instructions. . .If a party does 
not object and articulate the grounds with sufficient specificity such that the 
issue is presented before the trial court for consideration, that issue cannot 
be raised on appeal. 
R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 40 P.3d 1119, 1123 (Utah 2002) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 51). 
Moreover, while an appellate court may review the failure to give an 
instruction in its discretion and in the interests of justice, the aggrieved party has the 
burden of presenting special circumstances warranting such a review. See id. at 1124. In 
this case, however, Hatch failed to properly preserve the jury instruction issue. 
Moreover, in support of his position, Hatch cites to the abrogated case of Spears v. 
Warr, 44 P.3d 742 (Utah 2002) (abrogated by RHN Corp. v. Veilbell, 96 P.3d 935 (Utah 
2004) and Pierce v. Pierce, 994 P.2d 193 (Utah 2000), for the proposition that an issue is 
sufficiently preserved for review when a trial court rules on an issue. Thus, Hatch argues 
that when the trial court indicated in a post-trial memorandum that the statute of 
4 
limitations issue was not a legitimate issue for the jury to consider, see Brief of 
Respondent at 23 (citing to R. 798 but meaning R. 793), the jury instruction issue was 
preserved for appeal. This Court must reject this argument since, again, it does nothing to 
show that Hatch made a proper and specific objection at trial regarding giving any 
instruction other than his own, and if anything, supports Davis' argument that not only 
was Hatch's proposed instruction incomplete as it did not account for Hatch's "entire 
course of conduct" (R. 793), but shows that any error in failing to give a general 
instruction was harmless error as the trial evidence supported the verdict. This Court 
should therefore rely on R. T. Nielson Co. as controlling authority and find that Hatch has 
not properly preserved the issue. 
Furthermore, Hatch fails to present any persuasive reason or special circumstances 
justifying a review of the issue absent a showing of a proper objection. Instead, Hatch 
inexplicably cites Low v. City ofMonticello, 54 P.3d 1153, 1163 (Utah 2002), and Busche 
v. Salt Lake County, 26 P.3d 862 (Utah App. 2001), for the proposition that an appellate 
court may affirm a trial court's judgment if it is sustainable on any legal ground apparent 
in the record. See Respondent's Brief at 27. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals did 
not affirm the decision of the trial court, so the cases provide no guidance in favor of 
Hatch. Instead, the authority actually supports Davis as this Court may affirm the trial 
court's orders and affirm this verdict in favor of Davis based on any theory supported by 
the record, or lack thereof (such as failure for Hatch to preserve the record, the 
5 
established rule that a court need not instruct a jury based upon an incomplete instruction, 
and harmless error3). 
Hatch also cites Anderson v. Utah County Bd. of County Com 'rs9 589 P.2d 1214 
(Utah 1979), and State ex rel S.A., 37 P.3d 1172 (Utah App. 2001), for the notion that an 
appellate court has a duty to address issues that may rise again on remand. See 
Respondent's Brief at 27-28. However, this principle of law does not justify the 
determination of an issue not properly preserved for appeal, nor whether an appellant 
presented special circumstances warranting appellate review in the absence of proper 
preservation. Importantly, if, as Davis suggests, Hatch failed to properly preserve the 
issue, the issue has been waived and there will be no need for further remand. 
Overall, Hatch's argument does not aid this Court's decision. Because Hatch only 
specifically objected at trial to the court's refusal to give his proposed instruction, the 
finding by the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred in giving an instruction on the 
four-year statute of limitations in general was not preserved for appeal. Because the Court 
of Appeals reversed on an unpreserved issue, this Court must now correct that error. 
3Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 61 provides: 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or 
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any 
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment 
or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with 
substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any 
error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties. 
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B. Hatch Provided an Insufficient Appellate Record. 
Moreover, Hatch failed in his duty as the appellant to both present a complete 
record and appropriately cite to the record as required by appellate rules and Utah case 
law. See e.g., Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A) (requiring citation 
showing issue was preserved); State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993). This Court 
has explained: 
Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty 
and responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate record. 
Absent that record defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral 
allegation which the review court has no power to determine. 
Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 67 (internal quotations omitted, italics in original). 
Hatch has never once cited to the record illuminating the reason why his 
proposed jury instruction was not given. Hatch has never provided record as to what 
discussion was held before the trial court in coming to its decision, what representation 
both Hatch and Davis made to the court regarding the instructions, nor, again, that Hatch 
posed proper and specific objections. Hatch again fails to do so now. See Respondent's 
Brief at 23-28; cf Hatch v. Davis, Case No. 20020778-CA, Brief of Appellant at 6. 
Therefore, without any record to the contrary and "[i]n the absence of an adequate record 
on appeal, this Court can only assume the regularity of the proceedings below." Wetzel, 
868 P.2d at 67. This conclusion is particularly compelling in light of the fact that the trial 
court ''carefully considered [Hatch's] request in light of the evidence and made its ruling 
on the record" - a record not provided to this Court (R. 917). 
7 
C. The Trial Court Was Not Required to Give Hatch's Erroneous 
Instruction. 
As set forth in initial briefing, a trial court is not required to give an instruction that 
erroneously states the law or is unsupported by the facts presented at trial. See State v. 
Bluff, 2002 UT 66, § 21; State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 616 (Utah App. 1997); State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781, 799 (Utah 1991). Nor is a court required to give an instruction that 
has not been offered as it is not the trial court's duty to make a case for a party. Cf State 
v. Woodall, 305 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah 1956). Consequently, a party must offer a correct 
instruction before he can complain of the trial court's failure. See Kesler v. Rogers, 542 
P.2d 354, 358 (Utah 1975). 
Also as set forth in initial briefing, and with regard to claims of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress: 
Because of the nature of this cause of action, it can be difficult to determine 
when all its elements-intentional, outrageous conduct proximately causing 
extreme distress-have come into being. Of particular difficulty is the 
element of injury-extreme emotional distress. 
Retherfordv. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 975 (Utah 1992) 
This Court also recognized: 
we hold that the statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress does not begin to run until the distress is actually inflicted, i.e., 
when the plaintiff suffers severe emotional disturbance. . .Although easy 
to describe, this standard is difficult to apply, particularly because the 
element of emotional distress is specific to the plaintiff in each case. 
Because the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires 
actual emotional distress, . . ., this element is to be gauged subjectively. 
Id. at 975-976 
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Hatch argues, however, that the instruction he proposed was not an incorrect 
statement of law as the continuing violation theory alluded to in Retherford was not 
clearly established law. Hatch reasons: 
The cases cited by Davis regarding the refusal of the trial court to give an 
erroneous instruction are. . .clearly distinguishable by their facts, as they 
deal with instructions that are clearly erroneous and directly contrary to the 
law. . . These cases are far different than in this case, where this Court in 
Retherford stated that the four year limitation period did apply; and that it 
was not adopting the continuing violation theory for infliction of emotional 
distress. 
Respondent's Brief at 26. 
Contrary to Hatch's argument is the fact that in Retherford, the facts of the 
particular case did not require this Court to formally adopt a "continuing violation 
theory." Rather, this Court decided on the specific facts of that case that the alleged 
intentional infliction of emotional distress did not accrue until September 1985, thereby 
placing the April 1989 filing of the complaint within the four-year statute of limitations. 
See Retherford, 844 P.2d at 976-77. This Court stated that "the record before us 
identifies this moment [when the plaintiff experienced the extreme emotional distress]." 
Id. at 976. No such specific date could be pinpointed in this case. 
Moreover, even assuming that Retherford's allusion to the acceptance of a 
continuing violation theory was not controlling at the time, Hatch's proposed instruction 
was still incomplete and would have erroneously advised the jury as to the law. Again, 
Hatch's proposed statute of limitations instruction stated: 
9 
Utah's four (4) year limitation period applies to Davis's claims for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Under Utah law, that statute of limitations begins to run when the 
cause of action accrues. 
A tort cause of action, including intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, accrues when all of its elements come into being and the claim is 
actionable. 
The statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress begins to run when emotional distress is suffered. 
If emotional distress was suffered before the last four (4) years 
preceding Davis's Counterclaim, which was filed July 21, 1999, Davis's 
claim for emotional distress is time barred and you cannot award 
damages for Mr. Davis for such distress. 
(R. 695) (incorrect pagination in record, emphasis added). 
This instruction is not only incorrect in failing to account for ongoing conduct, but 
it effectively advises the jury that Davis' claim is time barred and that no damages could 
be awarded if any emotional distress was suffered prior to the four years before the filing 
of the claim. While this Court's opinion in Retherford may not have firmly resolved how 
continuing conduct would be considered, this Court clearly acknowledged that there were 
times where a continuing violation would occur and provided guidance as to how to deal 
with the issue. Moreover, Retherford clearly allowed recovery if some of the outrageous 
conduct, and additionally some of the emotional distress, was outside of the four-year 
period. So long as the plaintiff subjectively suffered the extreme or severe emotional 
distress within the limitations period, recovery is allowed. By proposing an instruction 
suggesting that Davis could not recover if any emotional distress was suffered prior to the 
four-year period, Hatch's instruction was incorrect and misleading and the trial court 
correctly refused it. 
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II. THIS COURT MUST PRESUME THAT DAVIS DEMONSTRATED AN 
EXCEPTION TO THE "PRESENCE" REQUIREMENT FOR 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
While it is true that a trial court's interpretation of law is reviewed for correctness, 
see Brief of Respondent at 28, the Court of Appeals' decision not only analyzes a 
question of law (i.e.: will Utah recognize an exception to the presence requirement?), but 
also applies that law to this case and makes findings of fact (i.e.: did the evidence support 
a showing sufficient to meet any exception to the presence requirement and did the 
evidence likely impact the jury verdict?). The Court of Appeals' "fact-finding" was 
improper absent a complete record. Ignoring the fact that almost the entirety of Davis' 
case had been purposely excised from the appellate record, the Court of Appeals 
nonetheless claimed an ability to determine both what evidence was presented on this 
issue as well as the manner in which the evidence likely impacted the proceedings. See 
Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, J^ 53 ("In the instant case, no.. .compelling 
circumstances exist, especially when there was no evidence presented that Defendant's 
wife was injured or suffered emotional distress as a result of Plaintiff s conduct" and 
continuing that "because the jury likely took this evidence [of conduct toward Judy 
Davis] into account. . .we conclude that Defendant [sic] was prejudiced by the 
admission of this evidence") (emphasis added). 
In sum, although Davis urges this Court to adopt exceptions to the presence 
requirement usually necessary for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
regardless of what this Court ultimately determines "is Utah law" on this issue, that ruling 
11 
should have no impact on the verdict in this case. Application of the ruling to these facts 
cannot fairly be accomplished while only reviewing the record of half a case. 
A. This Court Should Adopt Exceptions to the "Presence Requirement." 
As noted by Davis in his initial brief, courts have recognized that comment / and 
the caveat to Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts may provide an exception 
to the "presence" requirement in a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
See Petitioner's Brief at 27-31. Among the cases decided by courts utilizing this 
exception are Foster v. Trentham's Inc., 458 F. Supp. 1382, 1384 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); 
Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 703 F.2d 1152, 1166 (Colo. 
App. 1981); and Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1274 (3d 
Cir. 1979). Contrary to Match's claim that "such cases deal only with the circumstances 
of a loved one dying or being sexually assaulted," Respondent's Brief at 30 (emphasis 
added), none of the aforementioned cases deal with such circumstances. Rather, Foster 
dealt with a wife distressed by the malicious prosecution of her husband, Malandris dealt 
with a wife distressed by her stockbroker's access of her account through her husband, 
and Chuy dealt with a plaintiff distressed by a team physician's comments made to the 
news media. Moreover, the decisions in these cases relied upon the fact that "the plaintiff 
was the party most likely to suffer emotional distress upon learning of the defendant's 
actions." Malandris, 703 F.2d at 1166. Thus, contrary to Hatch's argument, it is not only 
"[u]nder such egregious circumstances [as death or assault] an exception may arise to the 
presence requirement." Respondent's Brief at 30. 
12 
In addition, Hatch argues that without a "presence" requirement, there is no way to 
limit the number of individuals that may state a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. See Respondent's Brief at 29. Hatch contends, 
The purpose of the presence requirement is to put some limit on such 
liability to the plaintiffs who are present at the time, as distinguished from 
those who later discover what has occurred. Without such a limitation the 
number of persons who may suffer emotional distress is virtually unlimited. 
Id. This argument ignores the aforementioned requirement typically imposed by courts 
utilizing the exception-that the claimant be the party most likely to suffer emotional 
distress upon learning of the defendant's actions. Obviously there are limits upon the 
number of potential persons who are most likely to suffer, so consequently, there is no 
absolute need for the "presence" requirement in all but the most egregious circumstances. 
B. Due To An Inadequate Record, Application of the Facts To This 
Court's Ultimate Ruling Is Improper. 
Whether this Court recognizes any exception to the presence requirement under 
"Utah law" or not, further application of that ruling to the facts of this case would be 
improper due to the incomplete appellate record provided by Hatch. Any application of 
the law espoused by this Court would necessarily require a review of the trial evidence. 
For example, if the Court finds that the presence requirement will not be recognized in 
Utah, the Court must then apply that ruling to the facts of this case to see if the error in 
allowing testimony concerning Judy Davis was harmful. AccordUtah Rule Civ. P. 61. 
Further, if the Court finds that the presence requirement will be excepted in Utah under 
certain conditions, the Court would similarly be required to review the trial testimony to 
13 
determine whether the evidence supported the exceptions. However, in this case where 
there are huge voids in the record of the trial evidence, such factual application cannot be 
conducted. Consequently, no matter which course this court takes regarding the legal 
issue, there is no means by which the court can weigh its effect upon proceedings below. 
Accord Utah rule Civ. P. 61. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD FIND THAT A PROPERLY INSTRUCTED JURY 
VERDICT CURED ANY POSSIBLE DEFECT IS DAVIS' INITIAL 
PLEADINGS. 
A jury which had been fully and properly instructed on all of the elements of a 
claim of abuse of process fully considered the evidence presented to them and rendered a 
verdict in favor of Davis. Incredibly, the Court of Appeals reversed that verdict choosing 
to ignore both the correctness of the instructions as well as the fact that a complete record 
of what evidence the jury considered was not before them. Instead, the Court of Appeals 
reached back to the pleadings on file and ruled that Hatch's motion to dismiss should 
have been granted. Even if this Court should determine that the pleadings were indeed 
insufficient, this Court should also find that any plausible defect was fully cured not only 
through the civil discovery process, but when the jury received and considered this case 
based upon complete and accurate instructions. 
A. Davis Sufficiently Pled a "Willful Act" in Accordance with Utah's 
Liberal Pleading Requirements. 
An abuse of process claim requires: (1) an ulterior purpose, and (2) an act in the 
use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of proceedings. See Hatch v. 
14 
Davis, 2004 UT App 38, f^ 34. With respect to pleading this claim under Utah's pleading 
requirements, 
a complaint is required to give the opposing party fair notice of the nature 
and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of 
litigation involved. A complaint does not fail to state a claim unless it 
appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under 
any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim. 
Christensen v. Lelis-Automatic Transmission Service, 467 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1970); see 
also, Peeples v. State, 2004 UT App 328, \ 19, n.l. 
With respect to these liberal pleading rules, Hatch's argument is largely 
immaterial. See Respondent's Brief at 34. He focuses on the fact that "Davis never 
amended his pleadings and never sought leave to amend his counterclaim for abuse of 
process, in order to include any further allegations or facts that would constitute a willful 
act for an abuse of process claim." Id. Such argument misses the mark and ignores the 
purpose of the rules. Indeed, this Court has stated, 
the fundamental purpose of our liberalized pleading rules is to afford parties 
the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have 
pertaining to their dispute subject only to the requirement that their 
adversary have fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the 
claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved. The 
functions of issue-formulation and fact-revelation are appropriately left 
to the deposition-discovery process. 
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added). 
With this standard in mind, Davis' counterclaim provided adequate notice of the 
nature and basis of his abuse of process claim; thus, there was no need to amend. 
However, even absent the liberal pleading rules, Davis did in fact allege in his 
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counterclaim an improper willful act associated with Hatch's use of process. Specifically, 
Davis alleged that Hatch sought to coerce him and the other residents of Boulder to 
comply with Hatch's position. (R. 5-6; R. 61-62). Under these circumstances, such 
coercion amounts to nothing short of extortion, and allegations of this conduct may 
clearly form the basis of a claim for abuse of process. See Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 
38, 1^ 33 ("usual case of abuse of process is one of some form of extortion") (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682 cmt. b (1977)); see also, Koolv. Lee, 134 P. 906, 
910 (Utah 1913) (citing as example a case involving extortion). 
B. The Discovery Process Further Revealed the Facts Supporting Davis' 
Claim. 
Also as noted above and in prior briefing to this Court, Utah's liberal pleading 
rules leave the functions of issue-formulation and fact-revelation to the deposition-
discovery process. Williams, 656 P.2d at 971. Throughout discovery in this case, Davis 
clearly set forth his theory that Hatch used this lawsuit to compel Davis and others to 
comply with his views and as a means of living off the filing of frivolous lawsuits. Hatch 
was given more than reasonable and fair notice of Davis' theory and the type of litigation 
it would involve, a point Hatch completely ignores in his brief to this Court. See 
Respondent's Brief at 32-35. 
C. The Properly Instructed Jury Verdict Moots a Defective Pleading. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a properly instructed jury verdict should 
trump any technical defect in an initial pleading. Hatch argues that Davis has failed to 
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state any law in support of his argument that this Court should consider the jury verdict as 
it relates to the abuse of process claim. See Respondent's Brief at 34. To the contrary, 
Davis supported his argument with the analogous cases of State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, <|[ 
13; State v. BlubaugK 904 P.2d 688, 694 n.3 (Utah App. 1995); and State v. Quas, 837 
P.2d 565, 566-67 (Utah App. 1992). Although criminal, these cases provide useful 
guidance. In each, a defendants' post-verdict challenge to defects in charging or bindover 
were considered to have been mooted or cured by the juries' ultimate verdicts. If a 
criminal defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to appeal is trumped by a jury's 
verdict, it would seem to follow that in civil litigation where there are no constitutional 
rights at issue, that the same standard would apply. 
In this case the jury returned their verdict after being directed on the elements of 
"abuse of process" based upon an instruction proposed by Hatch.4 Under such a 
circumstance, it is appropriate for this court to presume that any perceived defect in the 
wording of the complaint was cured when the jury was fully and accurately instructed on 
the elements of the claim. 
D. Hatch Misconstrues Davis5 Argument 
Finally, Hatch incorrectly states that Davis is arguing for a relaxation of the 
requirements for an abuse of process claim. See Respondent's Brief at 35. He stated, 
Given the allegations in Davis' counterclaim for abuse of process, it is clear 
that Davis has failed to allege a "willful act" outside the regular course of 
the proceeding, as part of his claim for abuse of process. This element 
4
 This instruction was not appealed. 
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properly limits the claim to instances where the process is abused outside its 
regular course of proceeding, not simply when a party filing may have an 
ulterior motive. This is why the courts have refused to imply an improper 
act from an ulterior motive. This Court should not expand the requirements 
for an abuse of process claim to include such an implication, as argued by 
Davis; otherwise, any allegation made by a party that an action was 
commence [sic] for an improper purpose alone, i.e. to intimidate, would be 
sufficient to state a claim for abuse of process. 
Id. However, Davis has not suggested that the simple act of filing a lawsuit with an 
ulterior motive is sufficient, or that an improper act is not required for an abuse of process 
claim. Rather, he has consistently argued that coercion and extortion of the type 
employed by Hatch should be considered improper acts, as should filing lawsuits as a 
money-making career, and should therefore satisfy the "willful act" requirement of abuse 
of process. See Petitioner's Brief at 42; Hatch v. Davis, Case No. 20020778-CA, Brief 
of Appellant at 31. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, and the points and authority set forth in Davis' initial 
Brief of Petitioner, this Court should reverse the Utah Court of Appeals' decision 
and uphold the jury verdict and award favorable to Larry Davis. 
DATED this-22_ d ayof J u l y 2 0 0 5 -
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
ANN MARIE TALIAFERRO 
Attorneys for Larry Davis 
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